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1 
SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS: A COMMONS APPROACH FOR 
DEVELOPING INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
This  study  empirically  investigates  the  relationship  between  design  structure  and  organization 
structure  in  the  context  of  new  infrastructure  development  projects.  Our  research  setting  is  a  capital 
program to develop new school buildings in the city of Manchester, UK. Instead of creating a controlled, 
hierarchical  organization,  which  would  mirror  the  buildings’  design  structure,  the  Manchester  City 
Council created a “commons organization,” and chose to share decision-rights with local claimants. Each 
school’s faculty was thus given rights equal to Council staff to participate in the design process and to 
approve the school’s design. In the natural resources literature, commons theory predicts that, if a robust 
governance structure is created, this complex form of organizing gives claimants incentives to contribute 
to the enterprise whilst dampening collective action problems (Ostrom 1990). Here we extend this claim 
to the production of man-made artifacts. The design commons induced teachers to volunteer time and 
effort to communicate their practical knowledge, but created corresponding tensions over interdependent 
choices for the final design. Yet, none of the projects succumbed to collective action problems in the form 
of budget overruns, bogged-down processes, or users feeling disenfranchised. Applying Ostrom’s (1990) 
principles of robust commons governance, we show that the Manchester design commons organization 
was robust by her criteria and propose that robustness contributed positively to the outcome. We also 
discuss  design  flexibility  as  an  intervening  variable  that  was  critical  in  reconciling  differences  that 
governance alone could not resolve. We conclude with the rudiments of a theory describing when and 
why a commons organization can be advantageous for production of designs.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Does the physical structure of a design constrain the structure of the organization that produces the 
design? Scholars commencing with Henderson and Clark (1990) have argued that design organizations 
will “come to mirror the internal structure of the product they are designing” (ibid. p. 27). This so-called 
“mirroring  hypothesis”  suggests  that  technology  imposes  a  structure  on  organizations  that  produce 
designs. To avoid integration failure (Puranam and Goetting 2011), designs with high levels of design-
choice interdependency (hence task interdependency in the design process) should be created by tight-knit 
teams with closely aligned incentives, generally lodged within a single firm (Thompson, 1967, Brooks 
1973, Nickerson and Zenger 2004, Colfer and Baldwin 2010). Conversely, modular designs with low 
degrees of design-choice interdependency can be created by loosely coupled individuals with disparate 
knowledge  and  incentives,  often  lodged  in  different  firms  (Orton  and  Weick  1992,  Langlois  and 
Robertson 1992, Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, Fine 1998, Baldwin and Clark 2000, Colfer and Baldwin 
2010, Puranam and Goetting 2011). Thus “the coordination tasks implicit in specific product designs SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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largely  determine  the  feasible  organization  designs  for  developing  and  producing  those  products” 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996, p. 64).  
However, simple versions of the mirroring hypothesis have been strongly challenged in theoretical 
work based on agent-based simulation models (Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003, Ethiraj and Levinthal 
2004a,b), and by Puranam, Raveendran and Knudsen (2012), who argue that organization structure may 
be a response to ignorance, not underlying design structure: “designers shape organizational structures 
when  they  cannot  shape  task  architectures:  the  latter  requires  …  a  higher  level  of  architectural 
knowledge.” In empirical settings, simple mirroring is observed in many cases, but exceptions are not 
uncommon, and the reasons for their occurrence are not well understood (Colfer and Baldwin 2010, 
Dawson, Fixson and Whitney 2012, Lundrigan and Gil 2013). Hence there is need for further theoretical 
and empirical investigation of the relationship between design structures and organization structures, with 
special focus on cases that violate the prescription of simple mirroring.  
This study addresses the need by investigating a class of problems underexplored in organization 
theory:  the  design  of  infrastructure  projects.  These  capital  assets,  which  include  transport  and 
telecommunication  systems,  utility  networks,  factories,  hospitals,  and  schools,  form  the  backbone  of 
modern societies.
1 Due to their long operating life and the scale and diversity of the resources required to 
build them, the development of new infrastructure directly affects many parties. Communities, operators, 
users, owners, funders, and regulators all have a stake in the outcome, thus may want to influence the 
design.  Integrating  their  heterogeneous  preferences a n d  n e e d s  i n t o  a  s i n g l e  d e s i g n  i s  h a r d ,  h o w e v e r ,  
because  many  infrastructure  assets  have  non-decomposable  design  structures  in  which  no  feature  is 
independent  of  all  others  (Gil  2009,  Gil  and  Tether  2011).  Choices  by  one  group  will  then  (almost 
inevitably) conflict with choices by other groups. Previous empirical studies reveal that excluding parties 
from the design process attenuates conflict in the short run, but also often leads to costly late changes 
                                                      
1   The National Academy of Engineering 2008 report Grand Challenges for Engineering dubs infrastructure development one of 
the grand challenges for the new century. The McKinsey Global Institute (2013) estimates that the world needs to invest $57 
trillion on new infrastructure to keep up with projected economic growth through 2030, a 3.5% of anticipated global GDP. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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and/or outright functional failure. As a result, infrastructure projects frequently run late, overrun budgets, 
and deliver outputs that leave many user groups and communities discontent (Morris 1994, Miller and 
Lessard 2001, Pitsis et al. 2003, Esty, 2004, Gil and Tether 2011). 
While the design structure of an infrastructure asset is established by physics and technology and 
thus is hard to change, the structure of the corresponding design organization—the organization that 
produces the design— is usually a matter of choice to some degree. In general, some claimants will have 
design rights ex officio: they can retain those rights within a tightly focused, hierarchical organization or 
share rights with other groups, thus widening the scope and diversity of the design organization. This 
degree of discretion makes infrastructure projects a suitable setting in which to study the relationship 
between design structure and organization structure. As more parties share design rights, the potential 
misalignment  between  design  structure  and  organization  structure  widens,  and  the  parties  must  then 
reconcile  their  inconsistent  beliefs a n d  h e t e r o g e n e o u s  a n d  conflicting  needs  to  arrive  at  a  functional 
whole. Thus the more parties with design rights, the greater the problems of collective action they will 
face (Libecap, 1989).  
Given  this  dilemma,  what  logic  should  be  used  to  determine  who  is  included  in  the  design 
organization  of  an  infrastructure  project?  Furthermore,  what  challenges  arise  when  the  organization 
structure is misaligned with the underlying design structure in ways that give rise to collective action 
problems? Finally, when and how can the members of the design organization collectively resolve their 
differences to avoid delays, budget overruns and outright failure?  These are the core questions that 
motivate this research. 
Collective  action  problems  have  been  extensively  studied  in  the  context  of  natural  resources. 
According to Garrett Hardin (1968), who first identified the “tragedy of the commons,” managing a 
collective asset requires either government regulation or private property rights. Mancur Olsen (1965) 
was similarly pessimistic about the ability of individuals to create and maintain collective goods. Without 
some form of compulsion, he argued, individuals will not voluntarily pay their proportional share of the SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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cost of a collective good but will instead free ride. 
Against the backdrop of these theories, Elinor Ostrom began to study how so-called “common pool” 
natural  resources  were  actually  managed  (Ostrom  1990).  Her  research  revealed  that  claimants  to  a 
common pool resource were frequently able to organize themselves to manage the resource collectively 
on a day-to-day basis and adapt to changing circumstances. The commons organizations in her field 
studies were characterized by multiple centers of power and nested levels of collective action and rule 
making, thus she called this form of organizing “polycentric governance.”  
According to Ostrom (2005), polycentric organizations can work in the presence of rules and forums 
where conflicts of interest and inconsistency of beliefs can be worked out, often through repeated face-to-
face interaction. Thus in a commons organization, polycentrism and hierarchical decision-making co-
exist. This form of organizing is complex, she admitted, but “complexity is not the same as  chaos” 
(Ostrom 2010). She went on to elucidate a set of principles which can be used to assess the “robustness” 
of commons organizations, i.e., which ones are more likely to succeed and which are prone to failure.  
Our focal setting in this research is a design organization created by the Manchester City Council 
(hereafter the Council) to design new school buildings. The national government gave the Council broad 
decision rights over school design, but rather than retaining those rights, the Council set up a complex 
“meta-organization” (Gulati et al. 2012) involving the schools’ faculties, Council staff, and contractors. 
Significantly, the Council gave each school’s faculty co-equal rights to approve the design so that no 
building project could go forward unless signed off by both the school and the Council staff. In this way, 
the Council chose to implement the schools’ design process using a commons organization subject to 
collective decision-making instead of adopting a more centralized approach controlled by the Council 
staff. 
We conducted qualitative, inductive research on six school design projects during the “first wave” of 
the Manchester school building program. Our initial purpose was to build grounded theory around the 
question:  can  an  organization  based  on  collective  decision-making  effectively  carry  out  a  highly SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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interdependent, non-decomposable design process? As the data accumulated, three subsidiary questions 
arose: had a commons organization been created to design the Manchester schools? Was this organization 
robust according to Ostrom’s principles of commons governance? And does robustness contribute to high 
performance in terms of developing designs within budget and on time, and able to meet a broad array of 
interests and preferences? This paper reports our findings. 
In sum, we will argue that a commons organization can be an advantageous way to organize design 
work for capital assets with a high degree of design-choice interdependence that also impinge on many 
heterogeneous groups. As indicated, this situation is endemic to infrastructure projects that are central to 
the socio-economic development of modern societies. In a design commons organization, producers and 
funders share design rights with knowledgeable stakeholders, such as users, in order to acquire valuable 
information. The information thus acquired allows the final design to better address collective needs-in-
use,  and  importantly,  it  cannot  be  obtained  in  any  other  way ( e . g . ,  v i a  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  o b s e r v a t i o n  o r  
statistical analysis). In the best of circumstances, the output of a robust design commons organization is a 
timely and makeable design for a long-lived capital asset that people with heterogeneous preferences can 
both share and afford. 
Our study yields four contributions to a better understanding of the relationship between design 
structure  and  organization  structure.  First,  violations  of  simple  mirroring  can  serve  to  bring  into  the 
design organization important knowledge about subsequent use patterns. Specifically for artifacts with a 
high degree of design-choice interdependence that must be shared in use, a commons organization can 
strike a balance between the provision of design-relevant information and collective action problems 
leading to design failure. Second, collective action problems inherent in the design commons approach 
can  be  mitigated  by  setting  up  robust  governance  rules  and  practices.  Third,  in  addition  to  robust 
governance, flexibility in the design itself can contribute in a major way to the success of the design 
organization. Fourth, the design commons form of organizing is likely to increase ex post user satisfaction 
as  well  perceptions  of  legitimacy  of  the  design  process,  but  conversely  it  can  also  lead  to  more SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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conservative, less innovative designs being selected and to a more unequal allocation of resources than 
would arise in a more centrally managed and hierarchical organization. 
In  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  we  first  locate  Ostrom’s  work  in  relation  to  interorganizational 
collaboration theory and the economic theories of relational contracts and property rights. Then, in a 
theoretical section, we develop the concepts needed to apply commons theory to design organizations, 
explaining when and why a design can be viewed as a common pool resource, and how collective action 
problems increase the risk of design failure. Next, we describe our research setting, data, and methods. In 
the analytic section, we explain how the Council set up the school design organization and we evaluate its 
robustness using Ostrom’s criteria. We conclude by arguing that the advantage of the design commons 
form of organizing  in general rests on its ability to solve a tricky provision-of-information problem at 
low cost while containing collective action problems by means of social norms and context-sensitive 
rules. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
Ostrom’s theory of polycentric organizations and commons governance is related to theories in other 
fields, specifically the theory of interorganizational collaboration (Schelling 1960, Raiffa 1982, Gray 
1989, Pitsis et al. 2003, Ansari et al. 2013), the economic theory of relational contracts (Poppo and 
Zenger 2002, Baker et al. 2002, Gibbons and Henderson 2011), and property rights theory (Gordon, 1954, 
Libecap 1989). In a brief space, it is impossible to highlight all of the many points of connection between 
these different large bodies of work. But it is fair to say that interorganizational collaboration theory tends 
to focus on the negotiating process—the phases, options, tactics, formal rules and protocols, as well as the 
role  of  external  parties  (courts,  arbitrators,  and  mediators)  in  settling  disputes.  In  contrast,  Ostrom’s 
commons theory focuses on the efficacy of social norm s, the rules of governance, and the goodwill 
generated by face-to-face interactions. Negotiations occur in all commons organizations, but the emphasis 
of her theory is not on negotiating and collaborating per se but on the rules that structure the claimants’ 
interactions and reward or sanction their behavior. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
 
 
7
The economic theory of relational contracts considers the structure of agreements that do not require 
enforcement by a third party such as a court. Agreements between self-interested agents can be self-
enforcing if the value of continuing to cooperate is higher (to all parties) than the value of defecting or 
reneging (Baker et al. 2002, Gibbons and Henderson 2011). Participants in a commons organization must 
believe that staying within that organizational framework, with all its rules, is more advantageous than 
leaving. But such organizations in general cannot be reduced to simple games of tit-for-tat. Thus, Ostrom 
includes relational contracts in her theory but her work is focused more on the practical design of a robust 
commons than on modeling the phenomena in terms of a small set of formal properties. 
Like Ostrom, some property rights theorists have focused on common pool natural resources that 
demonstrably  cause  conflicts  of  interest  hence  collective  action  problems.  Weakly  defined  or  poorly 
enforced property rights are known to hinder the efficient use of resources (Libecap 1989, Wiggins and 
Libecap 1985, Alston et al.1985). Both the commons and property rights literatures agree on the reasons 
why claimants struggle to cooperate, highlighting the number and heterogeneity of the parties involved, 
information  asymmetries, and conflicts over value distribution. But scholars working in the property 
rights tradition focus on law and/or formally negotiated contracts as the “solution” to collective action 
problems. In contrast, scholars working in the commons tradition highlight the role of socially-embedded 
local organizations and bottoms-up rule-making.  Thus, although property rights theory and commons 
theory focus on the same phenomenon, and the parallels are suggestive, up to now, the relationship 
between  the  two  literatures  has  hardly  been  explored.  (Klein  et  al.  2011,  is  a  recent  and  notable 
exception.)  
THEORY  
In this section, we draw on the extant literature to show how and when designs can be viewed as 
common pool resources, which in turn can be subject to commons governance. 
Background: A Taxonomy of Goods  
Economists typically array goods along two dimensions: (1) subtractability (also known as rivalry) SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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and (2) excludability. A subtractable good is one for which consumption or use by one claimant reduces 
the flow of benefits to others. An excludable good is one for which it is relatively straightforward to limit 
access by others than the owner, either by physical means or through property rights. In the lexicon of 
public economics, a “pure” private good is both subtractable and excludable. Examples include chocolate 
bars,  personal  computers,  and  family  homes.  A  “pure”  public  good  is  non-subtractable  and  non-
excludable. Examples include sunsets, parks without fences, and public roads. A “club” good is non-
subtractable, but excludable. Examples are parks with fences, private schools, and turnpikes. Finally, a 
“common pool resource” is subtractable and non-excludable. Examples are fish in the ocean, trees in an 
open forest, and books in a public library.  
In natural language, the word “commons” refers to a resource shared by a group of people (Hess and 
Ostrom, 2007). However, in the academic literature, the word is used in two distinct ways, which can be a 
source of confusion. In legal scholarship, a commons is a property rights regime in which some goods are 
made freely available to all on a non-discriminatory basis (Frischmann, 2012). In contrast, in Ostrom’s 
commons  theory,  a  commons  is  an  institutional  setting  in  which  a  subtractable  and  non-excludable 
resource  is  managed  collectively  by  local  claimants,  as  opposed  to  hierarchically  by  government 
bureaucrats or private property owners. Thus to correctly apply Ostrom’s principles, we must show when 
and why designs can be both subtractable and non-excludable. We take up the issue of subtractability 
first. 
Subtractability 
Subtractable goods are also known as “rival” goods.
2 Designs are often cited as classic examples of 
“non-rival” i.e., non-subtractable goods, because the recipes, blueprints, and programs that go into a 
design can be copied and used by an unlimited number of people (Cornes and Sandler 1986; Romer 1990; 
Lessig 2001; Hess and Ostrom 2007). In a strict, technical sense, the “consumption” of a design by one 
                                                      
2 In the economics of public/private goods, the terms “subtractable” and “rival” have the same meaning. Scholars studying 
natural resources, including Ostrom, generally use the term “subtractable.” Scholars studying knowledge and intellectual 
property, e.g., Romer (1990), generally use the term “rival.” We have opted to use Ostrom’s terminology. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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person does not leave less design to be consumed by others, hence designs can be seen as quintessentially 
non-subtractable (cf. Romer 1990, Baldwin and Clark 2006).  
Although  designs  are  not  subtractable,  choices  made  in  the  course  of  the  design  process  are 
subtractable from the perspective of the choosers. Design choices specify the structure of artifacts in 
terms of both form and materials. An artifact cannot have two forms at the same time: for example a 
building cannot be both square and round. Thus one design choice invariably rules out others. This fact 
alone would not be a problem if all claimants had identical preferences and beliefs. But when claimants 
have different priorities, one person’s choices will preclude another’s, thereby diminishing the value of 
the design for the second claimant. In effect, every choice made in a design process leaves fewer choices 
for others to make.  
Design structure affects the degree of subtractability of design choices. In some cases, the individual 
design decisions are highly interdependent, and each choice affects many others. Such designs are called 
“integral” (Fine 1998). Conversely, if a design is highly “modular,” then decisions in different modules 
will be independent of one other. In Herbert Simon’s words, the design (and design process) will be 
“near-decomposable” (Simon 1962, 1981). As long as different agents care about different modules, a 
choice made by one will not take away (important) choices from the others. In this sense, modular design 
choices are less subtractable than integral design choices. 
A tight budget increases the interdependency, hence the subtractability, of design choices. Given a 
fixed  budget,  what  is  spent  on  one  feature  cannot  be s p e n t  o n  o t h e r s ,  a n d  c l a i m a n t s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  
priorities must perforce compromise. An increase in the designed artifact’s longevity also amplifies the 
subtractability of design choices. The claimants’ understanding that some design choices will stay with 
them for decades makes it harder for them to give ground when negotiating design trade-offs. 
We now consider the issue of excludability. 
Excludability 
Excludability refers to the ease with which potential claimants can be prevented from accessing the SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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resource. While subtractability is largely determined by physical properties of the resource in relation to 
its consumption (is the resource depleted by consumption), excludability is determined by a combination 
of physical protections and property rights. Thus while the degree of subtractability of a good is hard to 
change, its excludability can be greatly affected by human actions (such as locking a door) as well as 
laws, social norms and conventions (such as patents and rights of privacy). 
As with all information goods, property rights and secrecy can be used to exclude unauthorized 
parties from using a design. Designs are thus generally deemed to be partially excludable (Romer, 1990). 
In the case of the Manchester schools, the blueprints could be viewed by anyone interested in seeing 
them, but they could not be legally reused without the Council’s authorization.  
In contrast, the design choices for each school had low excludability although they were not open to 
everyone. Various national government departments had formal design rights because they were either 
supplying funds or setting standards. Likewise, various Council departments had design rights because 
they were the recipient of funding, responsible for school performance, or had planning authority. The 
architects and builders could not be excluded from the process because the Council had limited technical 
capabilities in-house. However, the Council had the right to decide who else (if anyone) would have 
design rights. It chose to share rights with the schools’ faculties (but not with parents, pupils, and local 
communities). Once the Council announced this choice, the schools’ faculties could not be excluded 
unless the Council went back on its word (which would have had negative political repercussions).  
In  the  case  of  natural  resources,  the  more  agents  with  rights  to  the  resource  and  the  more 
heterogeneous their preferences and beliefs, the more likely it is that the group will fail to reach an 
efficient outcome (Libecap, 1989; Ostrom 1990). The same is true for designs. Design failures occur 
when  the  design  organization  fails  to  arrive  at  a  good  design  in  a  reasonable  amount  of  time.  One 
possibility is that the participants will fail to reach a consensus through impasse (claimants yielding little 
from their initial positions), or iteration (endless cycling through various alternatives that satisfy no one). 
Alternatively, the quality of the final design may be low because of holdup (one or a few groups blocking SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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progress until their demands are satisfied), optimistic bias (claimants settling on a design beyond their 
means), or excessive compromise that yields an unworkable, impractical, unwieldy, or inadequate result. 
As discussed above, building design choices are generally held to be quite interdependent, hence the 
mirroring hypothesis suggests that building design organizations should exclude all but a minimal core set 
of decision makers from direct participation in the process. (Other stakeholders may be consulted, but 
should not have control over final decisions.) In fact, many architectural firms follow this practice (cf. 
Yoo,  Boland  and  Lyytinen,  2006,  on  the  architect F r a n k  G e h r y ’ s  o r g a n i z a t i o n ) .  T h e  w o r l d - f a m o u s  
architect Renzo Piano put it this way: “You have to listen but you don’t have to be obedient” (Jacobs, 
2013). 
Thus, in terms of both property rights theory and the mirroring hypothesis, the Council seems to 
have been courting design failure when they included the school faculties in the design process and gave 
them veto power over final designs. Ostrom, however, offers a more optimistic view of the Council’s 
action.  Robust  commons  organizations,  she  argues,  can  deal  effectively  with  subtractable  and  non-
excludable goods by creating and enforcing context-sensitive rules to avoid collective action failures. By 
studying the practices of successful and unsuccessful commons organizations, she sought to infer the 
principles associated with success. After we explain our data and methods, we will apply her principles to 
the Manchester school design organization. 
RESEARCH SAMPLE, DATA, AND METHODS 
Sample 
The £450 million Manchester Building Schools for the Future (BSF) program was part of a £45 
billion national program to rebuild or refurbish all the government-funded high schools in England. The 
national program had three key stipulations: 1) the designs of the school buildings should be innovative 
and “transformative,” 2) fixed budgets would be set by formula; and 3) timescales were rigid. Hence, if a 
project exceeded the budget or ran late, the local authority had to foot the bill or see the scheme cancelled.  SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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Our research focused on a sample of six school design projects that were representative of the “first 
wave” of the school-building program in Manchester which included 11 projects. All of the schools were 
either operating in dilapidated facilities and/or had scored low in national league tables.
3 Notwithstanding 
these  challenges,  all  of  the  schools  had  received  positive  evaluations  from  Ofsted  (the  Office  for 
Standards  in  Education,  Children’s  Services,  and  Skills),  which  regulates  and  inspects  schools.  The 
Ofsted evaluations were viewed as evidence of the competence and dedication of the schools’ faculties. 
With this assurance, the Council chose to adopt the design commons approach across the board: 
We … could sack the head and replace heads of faculties, but that wouldn’t be democratic. We 
don’t work that way. … We work on the basis [that] these people … [are] capable, they’re there to 
improve attainment. If they become embattled and you give them a building with no choice, that 
doesn’t empower people to deliver better results. [Council senior manager] 
Against this homogeneous backdrop in terms of government mandates and design approach, we 
purposely formed our sample to be diverse and polarized, as recommended for process-focused inductive 
studies (Siggelkow 2007). Specifically, we sought to include schools with faculties that agreed with the 
national transformation agenda (according to Council interviewees), disagreed, and had mixed feelings. 
We  also  sought  to  create  a  sample  that  reflected  the  demographic  and  institutional  heterogeneity  of 
Manchester schools along three dimensions: 1) secular vs. faith-based,
4 2) multi-racial vs. homogeneous 
student bodies, and 3) free-standing vs. co-located with a community center or Special Educational Needs 
(SEN) school. Table 1 provides an overview of the six schools in the sample.  
TABLE 1- DESCRIPTION OF SCHOOLS IN THE SAMPLE  
School  Type   Socio-economic context Unique features of 
the school 
Ofsted assessment of overall school 
performance: categorical and qualitative 
Abraham  
  
1200-place 
comprehensive 
Multi-racial, 
significantly deprived 
area; 84% of pupils 
come from minority 
ethnic groups  
Mainstream school 
co-located with 
community center, 
and with Special 
Educational Needs 
(SEN) school in 
wave 2  
Good  
This is a good school with a range of outstanding 
features, serving its community extremely well…. 
This is an exceptionally inclusive school… The 
quality of teaching and learning is good. 
                                                      
3 Every year the government produces league tables for secondary schools based on the results of the previous summer's exams. 
4 Faith-oriented schools are state-funded but voluntarily aided by a religious organization that owns the school’s land. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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Gorton 
 
 
 
900-place 
comprehensive 
Extremely deprived and 
ethically diverse area; 
over 50% of the pupils 
are from minority ethnic 
groups; English is 
additional language for 
1/3 of pupils 
Mainstream 
school co-located 
with 110-place 
SEN school  
Satisfactory [mainstream]  
Teaching is good… students’ outcomes in terms of 
learning and achievement are satisfactory 
Outstanding [SEN] 
School has profound and beneficial impact on 
students and their families… students’ personal 
development and achievement are outstanding 
Newall  
 
 
900-place 
comprehensive  
Extremely deprived area; 
40% of the pupils 
potentially 
disadvantaged and 
vulnerable to 
underachievement  
Co-located with 
community center; 
school houses a 
center for pupils 
with severe learning 
difficulties  
Outstanding  
The care, guidance, and support provided are 
outstanding…. school team has proven track record 
of turning around disaffection and breaking cycles 
of underachievement, low self-esteem, and low 
opportunity  
Matthews  
 
 
1100-place  
faith-based  
 
Relatively disadvantaged 
area; 35% of students 
eligible for free school 
meals; 90% of students 
are from a white British 
background 
Free-standing 
school 
Satisfactory  
School has a number of significant strengths, 
particularly in the quality of care, guidance, and 
support offered to its pupils; teaching and learning 
are satisfactory  
Paul 
 
 
 
900-place faith-
based  
Socially and 
economically 
disadvantaged area; large 
influx of non-native 
English-speaking 
students 
Mainstream school 
co-located with 110-
place SEN school  
Satisfactory [mainstream] 
Pupils’ personal development is satisfactory… 
quality of teaching and learning is satisfactory… 
quality of care, guidance, and support is good  
Outstanding [SEN] 
Students leave as confident and well-rounded 
because their personal development is exceptional  
David  
 
850-place  
faith-based 
 
 
 
Proportion of students 
eligible for free meals 
below average; over 99% 
native English-speaking; 
students’ academic 
achievement well above 
national average 
Free-standing 
school; serves a 
wide geographical 
area (both city and 
suburbs) 
 
Very good  
The school aims to meet the needs of students who 
would have gone to the independent sector were the 
school not to achieve high examination 
performance...pupils’ spiritual, moral, social, and 
cultural development is very good  
Data collection 
To improve the accuracy of our data and the robustness of the conceptual insights (Jick 1979), we 
triangulated several data sources (Miles and Huberman 1984: 234). The fieldwork started in the spring 
2008 and spanned the following three years. The first author conducted 33 formal interviews (each lasting 
one to two hours), including school staff (#18); council staff (#10), and consultants (#5). He also took 
guided tours of both the old and new facilities, and reviewed archival data internal and external to the 
Manchester BSF program. The internal documents included school vision statements, design briefs, and 
drawings; project reports; council newsletters and press releases; schools’ newsletters and Ofsted reports; 
and articles in the local press. The external sources included the governmental websites of the Department 
for Education, teachernet.com, and Partnerships for Schools (PfS); design manifestos published by UK 
architectural  professional  bodies;  school  design  standards;  and  other  official  reports.  We  used  the SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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Manchester documents to analyze the design outcomes and to cross-check the respondents’ accounts of 
the operational rules and processes. We used the external websites and documents to cross-check the 
respondents’ accounts of higher-level governance.  
A senior Council official was our key contact. He introduced us to other Council members who, in 
turn, introduced us to the project staff. For the purposes of internal validation and to overcome inherent 
biases, we called the schools without introduction to arrange the interviews. We managed to interview the 
senior teachers participating directly in the design process, typically the head teacher,
5 deputy head, and 
some heads of faculties.
6 All interviews were recorded and transcribed. We were not requested to sign any 
confidentiality forms, provide anonymity, or run quotes by the interviewees.  
 Data analysis 
In our research, we aimed to develop a broad, contextualized understanding that would inform our 
core  questions  (Eisenhardt  1989):  What  was  the  motivation  to  misalign  design  and  organization 
structures? How did the misalignment affect project performance? What factors assisted or detracted from 
collective decision-making? To investigate these issues, we employed an iterative research process (Miles 
and Huberman 1984), and we embedded units of analysis in our interview structure in order to yield more 
generalizable and robust insights (Yin 1984). Specifically, we focused on two key sets of collective 
design choices and the processes surrounding them: 1) choices to design in or out innovative elements in 
the buildings; and 2) choices about design trade-offs in the face of fixed and tight budgets. 
We started our analysis with a set of high-level codes (Miles and Huberman 1994) that emphasized 
the teachers’ local knowledge and how that knowledge influenced their contribution to the design. Then, 
as we learned about the interaction between the Council and schools, we began to consider the notion that 
the design-in-process could be considered as a common pool resource, and that a polycentric design 
commons organization had been created. At that point, we used Ostrom’s (1990) framework to guide 
                                                      
5 A “head teacher” (of a mainstream or special education needs school) is the same as the “principal” of a U.S. secondary school. 
6 A “head of faculty” supervises the curriculum and teachers in a given subject area, for example, math, history, science. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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further data collection and analysis, often engaging in follow-up interviews to fill gaps in the data and to 
seek answers to questions that arose late in the analysis. Interviewing multiple individuals at different 
times helped to develop a more reliable theory (Miller at al. 1997). After an initial manual pass sifting 
through raw data and populating the sensitizing categories with data excerpts, we verified the coding by 
enlisting the help of a second scholar with knowledge of the research design. We continued to cycle 
between data and theory, refining the cross-case comparisons and searching for regularities (Langley 
1999). In this process, some codes became more salient (e.g., low excludability, high subtractability, and 
design flexibility) while others were dropped (e.g., lead users).  
ANALYSIS: ROBUSTNESS OF THE CREATED COMMONS 
Based on her study of success and failure in natural resource commons organizations, Ostrom (1990) 
proposed a set of eight design principles that can b e  u s e d  t o  g a u g e  t h e  “ r o b u s t n e s s ”  o f  a  c om m o ns  
organization. A number of studies have shown that these principles are correlated with the success of 
natural resource commons organizations, although no single principle is either necessary or sufficient 
(Cox et al. 2010). In this section, we use these criteria to assess the robustness of the Manchester school 
design organization. The principles are listed with brief descriptions in Table 2.
7 We discuss how well the 
Manchester organization conformed to these principles in subsections below. 
TABLE 2 - DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR A ROBUST COMMONS 
Principle  Explanation 
1. Nested “polycentric” 
enterprises 
Commons are parts of larger systems, with many centers of power, organized in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises.  
2. Clearly defined boundaries  The boundaries of the commons and its rightful participants are clearly defined. 
3. Proportionality of benefits 
and costs 
Rules affecting appropriation and provision are “congruent.” In other words, for 
each participant, the benefits of participation are roughly proportional to the 
costs, and those who pay the most, receive the most. 
4. Collective-choice 
arrangements 
Individuals affected by rules can participate in modifying them. 
5. Monitoring  Monitors who can audit the condition of the resource and the participants’ 
behavior are responsive and accountable to the participants. 
6. Graduated sanctions  Participants who violate rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions. Small 
and first offenses are identified, but not severely punished. 
                                                      
7 Ostrom (1990) presents the principles in a slightly dif feren t order, p lacing “ clearly defined boundaries” first and “nested 
polycentric enterprises” last. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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7. Conflict-resolution 
mechanisms 
Participants have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts. 
Ideally, conflict resolution should be face-to-face. 
8. Recognition and non-
interference by authorities 
The rights of participants to manage the commons, change local rules, monitor 
and sanction peers, and resolve their own conflicts are not challenged by 
government authorities.  
Source: Adapted from Ostrom (1990), pp. 90 and 180. 
1. Nested “polycentric” enterprises 
A  commons  organization  exists  within  a  larger  context  and  is  related  to  other  institutions  in  the 
surrounding society. In research in California, the Philippines, and Canada, Ostrom found that the larger 
system could support or undermine a commons organization in various ways. She theorized that the levels 
of rule-making should be nested, with higher-level organizations, like state  or national governments, 
spanning lower-level entities that are responsible for day-to-day operation and governance. If the lower-
level decision-makers stay within their constitutions, the higher levels should respect their decisions. 
Ostrom  called  this  form  of  organization  “polycentric”  because  there  are  many  centers  of  legitimate 
decision-making. According to Ostrom’s research, commons organizations fail on this criterion when law 
enforcement  is  compromised  or  corrupt,  when  higher-level  rule-making  authority  is  contested,  when 
conflicting rules are established by competitive agencies, or when a controlling bureaucracy (or private 
owner) interferes with (or fails to recognize) local self-governing organizations (Ostrom 1990, pp. 143-
181). 
On the surface, a polycentric commons organization resembles a classic firm or bureaucratic hierarchy 
making use of delegated authority (March and Simon, 1958). But, relative to these other ways of dividing 
work and integrating effort (Puranam et al. 2011), commons organizations are more consensual at all 
levels, and generally allow greater flexibility at the local level. Also the operational level of the commons 
(where  most  of  the  work  gets  done)  generally  relies  at  least  in  part  on  voluntary  participation  and 
uncompensated contributions of effort. Thus some of the polycentricity of a commons organization can be 
traced to the credibility and reassurance it offers to volunteers that their time and effort will not be spent 
in vain. In this respect, commons organizations are akin to some of the so-called “new” organizational 
forms, such as open source communities (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Baldwin and Clark 2006; SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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O’Mahony 2007; Puranam et. al. 2011).
8  
The highest level of rule-making in the school design commons was the national government, which 
supplied the money. Each school was given a fixed budget, determined by a formula that considered the 
number of pupils and the location. In addition, a critical justification for the national program was the idea 
that  innovative  school  buildings  could  “transform”  learning  (DfES  2003).  Innovative  pilot  projects 
promoted open floor plans and featured centers for e-learning and environmental discovery, state-of-the-
art ICT classrooms, movable pods, play decks, mobile classrooms, and themed learning centers. Such 
elements did not come at low cost, however, thus from the beginning, there was tension between the 
inflexible budgets and the aspiration to encourage innovative, “transformative” designs.  
The next level of organization was the “local authority,” in this case the Manchester City Council. Its 
top level is the “Executive”, made up of nine elected councilors. An apolitical team of Directors led by a 
chief executive implements Council policy, supervises the staff and reports to the Executive. The school 
projects were supervised by the Council’s Capital Programs group, which had longstanding relations with 
two design-build consortiums. Staff from Capital Programs were assigned to project teams to oversee the 
school designs and supervise the work of the architects and builders. In addition, to help deliver on the 
“education  vision”  described  in  its  bid  for  funding,  the  Council  appointed  an  internal  Learning 
Transformation  Team  (LTT)  made  up  of  three  former  teachers  who  were  familiar  with  the  national 
transformation agenda and criteria. As is typical of a “boundary-spanning broker” (Tushman 1977), the 
LTT served as a bridge between the Capital Programs staff and the schools’ faculties. 
Finally,  each  school  project  had  a  designated  “design  steering  group”  made  up  of  the  schools’ 
governors and faculty (the head or deputy head teacher, heads of faculty), Capital Programs and LTT 
staff, and private contractor employees. Construction on a given school could start only once the steering 
group signed off on the detailed plans. The “rules of the game” and the timetable were explained in a 
                                                      
8 However, the modular structure of open source code serves to dampen collective action problems, hence arguably makes the 
process of volunteering less risky (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; MacCormack et al. 2012). SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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School Starter Pack given to each school at the launch meeting for the project.  
The steering groups met roughly once every two weeks for approximately a year. Meetings generally 
took about three hours. These closed meetings were organized by the Council but normally took place at 
the school. In each steering group, a core of about 10 people regularly attended the meetings. The steering 
groups for different schools did not meet with one another, although some Council staff and contractors 
belonged to several groups and individuals such as head teachers inevitably talked to their counterparts in 
other professional forums. 
With respect to the criterion of nested, polycentric enterprises, we judge the Manchester design 
commons organization to be robust. As depicted in Figure 1, a nested hierarchy of decision-makers and 
rules defined the scope, participants, and procedures of the design process for each school. Higher levels 
of  the  organization  crafted  superordinate  rules  that  lower-level  participants  worked  within,  bent,  or 
refined.  Within  the  arena  defined  by  the  rules,  steering  group  members  could  exchange  ideas  and 
information and search for trade-offs and compromises.  
FIGURE 1 – SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE DESIGN ORGANIZATON 
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2. Clearly defined boundaries  
According to Ostrom, a robust commons organization needs clear boundaries specifying who has the 
right to participate and who has the responsibility to maintain the common pool resource. Boundary 
demarcation helps to avoid free riding and allows those within the boundaries to develop greater trust, 
reciprocity,  and  willingness  to  cooperate  (Ostrom  2005).  In  the  Manchester  design  commons 
organization, most of the substantive design work was done by the steering groups in closed meetings. 
Notably other parties such as parents and pupils were not invited to attend these meetings. 
The steering groups went one step further in demarcating the boundaries of the different participants. 
The Council staff proposed and all steering groups agreed (although some were unhappy about it) that the 
staff should keep the upper hand in resolving conflicts over technical construction issues. The staff cast 
the Council as “the landlord” that had to pay for building maintenance and, in this role, it ruled that all 
schools would have open ceilings to allow better access to pipes, wiring, and ventilation systems. Some 
teachers and school staff disliked the aesthetics of exposed plumbing and electrical systems (“It’s the 
maddest idea,” commented one deputy head), but others had no issues at all (“We’ll probably blink them 
out after a few days,” noted another head). 
As a quid pro quo, the Council staff offered to defer to the schools in conflicts over innovations that 
might  interfere  with  education.  Some  schools,  like  Gorton,  were  fully  on  board  with  the  national 
transformation agenda, but others were dubious or downright resistant. Some insisted that the proposed 
innovations—such as open floor plans—were not grounded in evidence, a key factor in facilitating the 
adoption of innovative ideas in complex institutional settings (Ferlie et al. 2005). Many also dismissed 
examples in which open plans had worked, arguing, as one LTT member reported, that Manchester’s 
“reality was a far cry from schools in leafy Copenhagen neighborhoods.”
9  
By  far  the  most  resistant  school  was  David,  which  also  had  the  highest  academic  performance 
according to the league tables. Here the teachers categorically dismissed all suggested innovations. The 
                                                      
9 Hellerup school in Copenhagen is an open-plan school that was often cited as a model by proponents of the transformation 
agenda. See, for example, CABE (2009). SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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deputy head put it, “The Heads of Faculty met, we had a clear vision of what we wanted, and we stuck to 
that.” This attitude created a dilemma for the Council staff, given the Council’s commitment in its bid to 
the national government for funding to promote innovative designs.  
Tensions notwithstanding, our evidence suggests that the boundaries of the design commons were 
well defined. Rights to participate in the design process and the responsibility to arrive at a workable 
design on time and within budget were vested in the steering groups. Membership in the steering groups 
was clearly delineated and the effective working groups were relatively small. 
3. Proportionality of benefits and costs 
For a commons organization to succeed, the benefits to each participant need to be proportional to 
the investment (Ostrom 1990). This was the case in our focal setting. For the Council, investing resources 
to arrive at innovative building designs was clearly worthwhile because the school-building program 
offered a one-time opportunity to modernize the city’s dilapidated schools with national government 
money.  The  value  proposition  for  the  builders  was  also s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d :  t h e y  w e r e  o f f e r e d  l i m i t e d  
commercial gains with limited risk. And because the builders’ profit margins were slim, they had strong 
incentives to participate actively in the design process to ensure that designs were consistent with the 
budget and schedule.  
For their part, the schools gained design rights by virtue of their participation in the steering groups, 
but they were asked to dip into their operating budgets to free staff to engage in the design process and 
attend (many) meetings. Consistently, the schools estimated their input at more than 1,000 staff hours 
spread over one year, with larger schools reporting a figure closer to 1,500 hours. Most schools found it 
frustrating to be called upon to supply valuable inputs “for free”. But the chance to get the design “right’’ 
was a benefit that was valuable enough to entice all of them to participate in the process from start to 
finish. 
On the whole, the Manchester design commons appears to have done a good job in providing all 
participants with benefits that exceeded the costs incurred. Evidence of this can be gleaned from the fact SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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that all participants stayed involved in the process until its natural conclusion.  
4. Collective-choice arrangements 
Another criterion for a robust commons organization is that individuals affected by rules can have a 
role in modifying them. On this dimension, the school design commons does not fare so well. Rules on 
the budget, building standards, and innovation were imposed by the national government, and were not 
subject to modification without great effort. Other rules on participation, the timetable, and the choice of 
the private contractor were established by the Council staff.  
The schools complained that the Council staff systematically pushed back attempts to modify the 
rules. The staff replied that, while they listened to all voices, they had to obey the rules set by their 
Directors. Indeed, some schools tried to circumvent the rules by using their political connections to find 
out if there was any slack in the budget or to lobby for their choices. As one SEN head explained, “I 
wouldn’t accept everything the [Council] team comes out with. We’ve got routes to challenge them. It’s 
using the politics back. We know the political and senior hierarchy of the teams.” In at least one case, the 
Council also used political backchannels, as the Abraham head described, “Our governing body was 
asked by the Council governor to approve a scheme we weren’t recommending. Luckily, it was turned 
down, [but] it was a dangerous time.” (The case of Abraham is described in greater detail below.) 
For the most part, however, the parties used steering group meetings to search for ways to bridge 
their differences while staying within the Council and nationally mandated rules. The one important 
exception was in the realm of budget overrides. With the Council’s compliance and even encouragement, 
a budget constraint could be relaxed if the school funded the excess.  
The case of Abraham illustrates another way in which rules were relaxed in response to pressure 
from local participants. Abraham was unique in that the first design process (2007) failed because of a 
fundamental disagreement over the minimum footprint of the building. As the head explained, “We were 
told we were not cooperating; we were in limbo. I then wrote [the Council] a hard letter saying that I 
wasn’t  being  uncooperative.  I  was  actually  doing  the  [Council’s]  job  for  them,  to  safeguard  the SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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youngsters’ needs and make sure they had a viable school for the future.” Thus, the design commons 
organization  arrived  at  an  impasse,  and  Abraham’s  building  was  not  included  in  the  first  wave  of 
construction.  Two  years  later,  the  parties  agreed t o  c o - l o c a t e  A b r a h a m  w i t h  a  S E N  s c h o o l ,  w h i c h  
increased its formulaic budget by £2m. A new design process was begun in 2009; the parties were able to 
reconcile their disagreements; and a new school was built in 2010-2012. Relaxing the budgetary rules 
(and in Abraham’s case, the timetable) was an important safety net for the commons organization. It 
allowed the steering groups to overcome the tensions inherent in the participants’ conflicting goals. But it 
also created inequities across schools (discussed below).  
5. Monitoring  
Commons theory argues that those who monitor and audit the commons’ conditions and participants’ 
behavior should stay accountable to the participants. The design commons organization was not robust on 
this dimension. By and large, the monitors were responsible to the government rule-makers and not the 
schools.  
First, the national government appointed the Commission on Architecture and the Built Environment 
(CABE) to monitor and control the innovative qualities of each school’s design. During two “health-
check sessions” that could last between three to four hours, members of CABE challenged each school’s 
design and asked for justifications as to why some choices contradicted the government mandate. Money 
to fund construction would not be released until CABE gave the go-ahead. 
Secondly, the Council Directors ruled that Capital Programs was the budget holder and that only its 
staff  could  give  instructions  to  the  private  architects  and  builders.  The  Directors  believed  that  these 
powers were needed to ensure that the designs stayed within budget. This was a tough rule because the 
national  formula  ignored  the  schools’  argument  that t h e  t r e n d  t o w a r d s  p e r s o n a l i z e d  l e a r n i n g  p l a c e d  
increased demands on space. As one deputy head remarked, “The funding methodology is based on a 
massively flawed formula that has been in place forever. … Everyone knows these flaws but no one is 
going to do [anything]…. It isn’t fair.”  SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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Thirdly, the Council staff made the external architects and builders responsible for monitoring the 
designs’ compliance with the national transformation agenda and for ensuring that the designs stayed 
within  budget.  In  the  steering  group  meetings,  the  architects  and  builders  worked  with  the  schools’ 
representatives  to  express  their  visions  and  accommodate t h e i r  p r i o r i t i e s ,  u s i n g  design  flexibility 
(discussed below) to creatively reconcile conflicting priorities and beliefs. At least officially, though, 
these monitors were not accountable to the steering groups but to Capital Programs and the Council.  
6. Graduated sanctions 
In commons theory, sanctions are needed because people are heterogeneous. There will always be 
some individuals with a propensity to break rules if they believe they can get away with it (Ostrom 1990). 
But flagrant or widespread rule-breaking often triggers a vicious cycle of defection that can end in failure 
for the commons organization. Thus, monitoring and sanctions are necessary.
10  
Although this principle makes sense, we found it empirically difficult to make sharp distinctions 
between breaking rules, changing rules, and exercising rights. Relaxing budget constraints when schools 
are willing to make up the shortfall seems like a sensible rule change. When Abraham’s head teacher, 
backed by his governing board, refused as a matter of principle to sign off on the design, that was an 
exercise of rights, not a rule violation per se. But the same action in a different context could be seen as 
holding up the process and demanding a bribe—a clear rule violation. 
In  addition  to  the  formal  rules  imposed  by  the  national  government  and  the  Council,  the  main 
informal rules were those of repeated private interaction, civility, and mutual respect. In the steering 
group meetings behind closed doors, sharp exchanges might have occurred but they remained private. At 
times, people issued threats to use political backchannels to overturn the process, but those actions were 
either ineffective or not carried out. (On the importance of face-to-face meetings in establishing and 
enforcing norms of reciprocity and trust, cf. Ostrom et al. 1994, Ostrom, 1998.) 
                                                      
10  However, Ostrom (1990) argues that a system of graduated sanctions is best because it assures participants that rules are being 
enforced but initial penalties will not be unduly harsh. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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7. versus 8. Conflict-resolution mechanisms versus recognition and non-interference by authorities  
We  discuss  these  two  criteria  together  because  they r a n  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  e a c h  a n o t h e r  i n  o u r  
empirical setting. On the one hand, Ostrom argues, participants in a robust commons organization should 
have access to effective and timely conflict-resolution mechanisms. On the other hand, the participants’ 
rights to devise their own rules should not be challenged by higher-level authorities (Ostrom 2005).  
In  the  Manchester  design  commons  organization,  conflicts  that  could  not  be  settled  within  the 
steering groups could be taken up to the Council Directors. In extreme circumstances (as in the case of 
Abraham), conflicts could be escalated to the Council Executive. Nevertheless, Council staff expressed 
frustration with the lack of a lower level of appeal. For reasons unrelated to the building program, the 
Council’s post of Chief  Education Officer (a position just below that of Director) remained unfilled 
throughout the program. One level up, the Council’s Director of Children Services had limited time to get 
involved. To avoid delaying the process, some Council staff thought they had compromised too much. As 
one program manager remarked, “the teachers have been carrying all the cards, but they’re not a client; 
they’re  a  user.  They  need  to  be  involved  but  shouldn’t  control.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  it’s  Council 
funding.”  
Unsurprisingly, the participants from the schools disagreed with this view. Faced with tight and fixed 
budgets,  school  participants  felt  they  were  “always r o b b i n g  P e t e r  t o  p a y  P a u l ” ,  a s  o n e  S E N  h e a d  
exclaimed. They also pointed out that the Council rarely relaxed technical requirements even after debates 
suggesting that some design standards were out-dated or inadequate.  
The presence of a Chief Education Officer would have implicitly put more power in the hands of the 
Council staff. This, in turn, might have undercut the autonomy of the steering groups, leading the schools 
to believe they had no real power in the process. Instead, within the space delimited by the rules, the 
steering group members had the power to bend the rules, devise compromises, and resolve their conflicts. 
Also contributing to the robustness of the commons, the national government limited its interference 
with  the  design  process  and  respected  the  lower-level  design  choices.  Provided  the  designs  were SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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consistent with the school’s vision, the “golden thread” as the Commission on Architecture and the Built 
Environment put it, the steering groups were allowed to produce traditional designs. This correspondence 
between the schools’ preferences and the final designs contributed to the schools’ overall satisfaction with 
the  design  process  and  outcomes  (see  the  discussion  of  performance  below).  But  we  also  observed 
instances  where  design  flexibility  (also  discussed  below)  was  critical  in  reconciling  the  divergence 
between the schools’ preferences and the national transformation agenda. 
Overall assessment of robustness 
On balance, the school design commons organization appears to have been quite robust, as measured 
by Ostrom’s criteria. The main fragilities were that 1) the local claimants had limited ability to change the 
high-level rules that were imposed from above by the national government and the Council, and 2) the 
monitors were accountable to the government and Council, not to the local claimants.  
Given  these  fragilities,  it  is  reasonable  to  question  whether  the  Manchester  school  design 
organization was a “true” commons where higher authorities respected local autonomy and collective 
decision-making vs. a bureaucracy masquerading as a commons where disputes would be escalated back 
up the hierarchy and settled by higher authorities. The case of Abraham, discussed above, supports the 
contention that the organization was not a bureaucratic hierarchy in disguise. Recall that the Council 
project team tried to over-ride the school’s veto by lobbying the school’s governors to approve the design. 
The head teacher, having been granted design rights and with faculty behind him, was prepared to fight 
back—‘I would have to finish writing to everybody in the government…if it [the design] had been pushed 
forward’, said the head. When push came to shove, the school’s governors (who legally controlled the 
school’s property, hence had to approve new construction) sided with the head teacher. For its part, the 
Council Executive did not press the issue further despite genuine worries that national funding could be 
lost. For better or worse, the Council had created
11 a genuine commons organization subject to collective 
                                                      
11 In Ostrom’s research, there are other instances of commons organizations being created by interested outside parties. Cf. the 
ARTI/Cornell water management initiative in Sri Lanka (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 168-73) SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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local rule. In this context disenfranchising the teachers was not a viable option.
  
In summary, within the steering groups, where most decisions were made, there was room to make 
genuine  tradeoffs  between  the  teachers’  practical k n o w l e d g e  a n d  t h e  C o u n c i l ’ s  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  t h e  
national government to create innovative buildings within fixed, tight budgets. Some of these tradeoffs 
took the form of pure compromise with each side giving up something to gain something else. But, as the 
next section describes, the architects also played a key role by making creative use of design flexibility. 
USING DESIGN FLEXIBILITY TO RESOLVE CONFLICT 
In a traditional setting, the commons organization manages a natural resource, and technologies are 
viewed as part of a static geophysical domain (Ostrom 2005). In our setting, the common pool resource is 
a design-in-process, that is, an artificial construct (Simon 1981). Hence, the technologies involved are not 
static, but subject to creative manipulation. Indeed, our research suggests that technological flexibility in 
the building designs was an important intervention (by the architects) that was used to reduce conflict 
within  the  commons  organization.  “We  try  to  reconcile  equals,”  said  one  architect.  Or,  as  another 
commented, “It’s a duty of care we’ve as professionals to … find solutions that don’t conflict.” 
 At the crux of many recurring conflicts were different planning horizons, often a source of tension 
among participants in a commons (Ostrom 1990) or in infrastructure projects (Gil and Tether 2011, Gil et 
al. 2012). The schools would only endorse designs they deemed fit for the purpose on the opening day, 
but the Council staff knew that the schools would be in use for 50 years or more. At many schools, this 
conflict became acute around the issue of open floor plans. Council staff on the steering groups did not 
want to overrule the schools, and the Learning Transformation Team admitted there was little good data 
to support the effectiveness of open plans (Woolner et al. 2007). One program manager explained “There 
was little time to educate schools, and teachers weren’t in the same wavelength. Some were in the dark 
ages. They thought they were the masters of the universe. They didn’t want to be fettered.”  
To address this conflict, the architects proposed to use flexible steel-framed superstructures with 
long spans and large floor plates to create areas that could be reconfigured from a traditional layout into SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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an open plan (and vice versa) at reasonable cost. Then, for the schools that rejected open plans, the 
architects proposed lightweight modular walls sitting on top of the floor rather than rigid load-bearing 
walls. For the schools with mixed feelings about open plans, they used retractable walls to create smaller 
spaces that could be recombined into large master classrooms. Finally, at all schools, they decoupled the 
air ventilation systems from the room layout by distributing multiple air-handling units on a dense grid, 
ensuring the provision of high-quality air irrespective of the wall locations.  
Of course, these investments in flexible designs did not come at zero cost: the retractable walls and 
modular air ventilation systems were more expensive than conventional solutions. Cost notwithstanding, 
design flexibility turned out to be a crucial factor in avoiding impasses within the steering groups as they 
converged towards final designs. For schools that were eager to embrace innovations but were concerned 
they might not work, flexible solutions were reassuring because the building layouts could be cheaply 
reconfigured into conventional forms. As Gorton’s assistant head summarized, “We’re trying to pioneer 
something [the open plan] here; see if it works. If it doesn’t in the end, it won’t cost that much money to 
put doors on.”
 At the other extreme, for a school such as David that categorically opposed innovation in 
building  design,
12 a  f l e x i b l e  d e s i g n  r e a s s u r e d  t h e  C o u n c i l  that  its  commitment  to  the  national 
transformation  agenda  was  fulfilled  to  some  degree.  As  the  architect  explained,  “We  responded  to 
[David’s] brief, but we gave them a building that carries this flexibility in its DNA. There are huge 
possibilities. They can knock walls down.” 
ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DESIGN COMMONS ORGANIZATION 
In addition to analyzing the robustness of the design commons organization using Ostrom’s criteria, 
we assessed its performance along three dimensions: 1) innovativeness, 2) participants’ satisfaction with 
the  process  and  the  outcome,  and  3)  equitability. O u r  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  i n n o v a t i v e n e s s  w a s  b a s e d  o n  a  
quantitative breakdown of building space into traditional and non-traditional areas—open plans and non-
                                                      
12 Although David’s faculty was conservative with respect to building design, the Council staff acknowledged that David was in 
the forefront in terms of pedagogical innovations. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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traditional layouts were the cornerstone of the government’s plan to transform education through capital 
investment. Our assessment of satisfaction was based on a qualitative evaluation of the comments by the 
schools’ leaders, Council staff, and private contractors. Finally, our assessment of equitability was based 
on the amount of extra funds (beyond the budget) that each school was able to apply to the project. The 
results are summarized in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 – PERFORMANCE OF THE DESIGN COMMONS ORGANIZATION 
Case  Innovativeness   Satisfaction of the school leaders  Equitability  
with the process  with the outcome 
Abraham  Traditional: 
Science area: only 
traditional labs (3); 
other faculty areas: 
94% traditional; 6% 
master rooms 
Negative [wave 1]; Positive [wave 2]: 
It [wave 1] was a very difficult, really 
upsetting experience…I was bullied a 
bit, but they [Council] couldn’t get me 
to agree to it. …In wave 2 everyone 
understood our point of view [Head] 
Positive [wave 2]: 
In addition to basic accommodation – 
we got 95% of that –we got 
enhancements. It’ll be a terrific 
boost…. I feel very happy about it 
[Head ] 
Privileged: 
School used £250K
in reserves to pay 
for extra staff room 
and all-weather 
pitches  
Gorton  Innovative: 
Science area: hybrid 
IT-equipped labs (6);
other faculty areas: 
52% traditional; 38%
master rooms; 10% 
open plan 
Positive: 
It was a fantastic process. I was never 
prepared for how much people would 
listen to what I say …I’ve been a teacher
for a long time. But single handedly, this
is the thing I’m most proud of [Assistant 
Head] 
Positive: 
The building is beautiful, absolutely 
astonishing: the tall ceilings, the glass,
the transparencies [Assistant Head] 
 
Somewhat 
privileged: 
Additional funds 
from co-location 
with SEN school  
 
Newall  Hybrid: 
Science area: only 
traditional labs (7); 
other faculty areas: 
55% traditional; 
45% master rooms 
Moderate: 
The process was as democratic as it 
could be…but the figures were shrouded
in secrecy; if you’re working together, 
and we worked quite well, you should be
more transparent [Deputy Head] 
Moderate: 
It‘s going to look really nice and 
practical, but the school we’re getting 
will be slightly smaller than the 
current school, which was never big 
enough – which is crazy, isn’t it? 
[Deputy Head]  
Privileged: 
School could afford
£500K loan to 
cover courtyard 
MatthewsHybrid: 
Science area: 3 
‘super-duper labs’ 
as put by the Head 
of Science; 
other faculty areas: 
74% traditional; 
18% master rooms; 
8% open plan  
Moderate/Positive: 
Some of the structures that are in place 
for BSF didn’t allow for changing the 
way we work …on some days, it felt like 
we had no share of voice [Deputy Head]
The process, although we sometimes 
might disagree, has been positive 
[Head] 
Moderate: 
We had to make the building smaller, 
lost rooms, ended up with a joined 
dining room-hall. But we’re going to 
have a wonderful school- it’ll still give
us phenomenal opportunities [Deputy 
Head] 
Underprivileged: 
No additional funds
except for the 
chapel (paid by 
diocese) 
 
Paul  Traditional: 
Science area: only 
traditional labs (7); 
other faculty areas:  
100% traditional 
Positive: 
We were involved. There’re always 
constraints when you actually build--
financial, building regulations, etc. You 
cannot argue with these principles 
[Head] 
Positive: 
We ended up with a good design 
[Head]  
I actually think we probably got 85% 
of our wish list. Didn’t get a roof 
garden, but can live with that [SEN 
head] 
Somewhat 
privileged: 
Additional funds 
from co-location 
with SEN school  
David  Traditional: 
Science area: all 
traditional labs (8); 
other faculty areas: 
100% traditional 
 
Positive: 
I think the process was successful. I 
didn’t find much tension working with 
the Council … as long as we were 
careful in explaining what we wanted 
[Deputy Head] 
Positive: 
Our environment is very nice now. The
majority of the spaces are better than 
the ones we had before, we rethought 
adjacencies, and got nearly all of them
how we wanted [Deputy Head] 
Very privileged: 
School raised £2m 
in a fund drive to 
refurbish old 
facilities slated for 
demolition SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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All in all, the design commons organization performed well in terms of satisfying the key interests of 
its participants, less well in terms of equitability, and poorly in terms of innovativeness. The satisfaction 
of the schools’ leaders can be traced to their impact on the designs. One faculty head, for example, said:  
[We were] given a blank canvas, it was, ‘this is your space, how do you want it to work?’ We 
were given a lot of freedom. ...I was able to say ‘I need about 28 computers round the edge, a 
meeting area in the middle, a separate lecture area. … If it doesn’t work, it’s my fault.” 
Although the design commons organization succeeded in producing designs that reasonably met the 
needs of teachers, a lack of equitability arose between schools with greater resources and those with more 
limited endowments. Gorton, for example, got a £0.5m loan from the Council to cover its courtyard and 
David launched a £2m fundraising campaign to cover the costs of extra work. In contrast schools like 
Matthews (which struggled to fund its chapel) believed they had compromised too much and felt less 
enthusiastic about the overall process. This suggests that while our observed commons recognized local 
variation and respected local rule-making (and rule-bending), it also replicated the distribution of wealth 
and resources across local districts.  
In addition, despite the efforts of Council staff to push for open floor plans and other innovative 
measures, innovative designs did not prevail within the steering groups. One Council staff member said: 
“what we’ve got sadly … is a number of ‘new old schools’. … [We] don’t have a fully transformational 
school.” In the final analysis, three schools opted for traditional designs and two for hybrid designs. Only 
Gorton wholeheartedly embraced the transformation agenda, and even there 52% of the non-science areas 
were laid out in a traditional manner. The locus of conservatism was in the schools’ faculties, thus it 
seems likely that a centrally managed Council-driven design process, in which the schools did not have 
veto rights, would have resulted in more innovative building designs but less user satisfaction. In general, 
decentralized, incumbent-driven processes lead to compromise, hence higher levels of satisfaction among 
participants. However, such satisfaction may come at the expense of new ideas, which are inherently risky 
and may be threatening to incumbents (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). A commons organization is not 
the best way to solicit or obtain highly innovative designs. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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As it turns out, the Council’s senior management and government watchdogs were happy to make 
this  bargain.  Like  the  schools’  leaders,  they  too  expressed  satisfaction  with  the  commons  form  of 
organizing. All projects in the first wave, with the exception of Abraham, got timely signoffs and were 
delivered  within  budget.  Furthermore,  no  politically i n f l u e n t i a l  s t a k e h o l d e r  derailed  or  overrode  the 
process. The Council affirmed its satisfaction with the commons form of organizing when it chose to use 
the same approach in “wave 2” of the school-building program (which was equally successful).  
The builders were content, too, because they appreciated working in an environment that did not lead 
to litigation. As one quipped, the margins were not high but neither were the risks. And for the architects, 
collaborations  with  schools  like  Gorton  were  very  rewarding  (“we’re  being  exhorted  to  be 
transformational; the heads were great”), whereas others were less so (“if the school has its eyes closed, 
we’ll deliver a more traditional design”). 
BEYOND SIMPLE MIRRORING: WHEN AND WHY CREATE A DESIGN COMMONS 
ORGANIZATION? 
In  this  section,  we  return  to  the  overarching  question:  when  and  why  is  a  design  commons  an 
advantageous way to organize design work? It is important to note that Ostrom herself did not claim that 
one  form  of  organization—even  a  commons—was  optimal  in  all  circumstances.  A  design  commons 
organization is one of several ways to approach the design of a long-lasting, shared resource. Designers of 
design organizations might opt for one approach or another depending on their constraints and priorities. 
Our job here is to lay out the pre-conditions and tradeoffs leading to an informed choice. 
A commons organization differs from government regulation in that it gives operational control of 
the resource to local agents and not to a top tier of bureaucrats. It differs from a private firm by providing 
for shared control, instead of control by a single owner. Local autonomy and shared control perforce give 
rise to many centers of legitimate decision-making, i.e., polycentricity. Thus, the defining properties of a 
design commons organization are: (1) polycentricity (many centers of power); (2) local autonomy; and (3) 
shared governance. SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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As indicated, the existing theory of the relationship between design and organization structure is the 
“mirroring hypothesis.” Mirroring implies that integral products should be designed by single authors or 
tight-knit teams within hierarchical organizations (bureaucracies or firms), whereas modular products can 
be designed by more loosely coupled organizations (Colfer and Baldwin, 2010). For projects with a high 
degree of design choice interdependency, a design commons organization violates strict mirroring in that 
it brings claimants who are not subject to hierarchical control into the design process, and gives them a 
substantive role and credible veto rights over the final outcome. For example, local users have direct, day-
to-day knowledge of how an asset will be used, but they are not employees of a government agency or a 
private owner and thus are unlikely to have design rights ex officio. In a design commons organization, 
key user groups are not just consulted: they can propose and promote their own ideas and veto those of 
others. Thus, in a design commons (as in a natural-resource commons), key users and sometimes other 
claimants  have  credible  stature,  legitimacy,  and  direct  influence,  not  because  they  control  the  purse 
strings  or  have  property  rights,  but  because  they  will  be  using  the  artifact  or  have  other  specific 
knowledge of its impacts. 
Sharing decision rights among heterogeneous claimants to this extent has both costs and benefits. 
The most obvious cost is an increase in the risk of failure. If heterogeneous claimants insist on pursuing 
their  own  agendas  at  the  expense  of  others’,  they m a y  c a u s e  a n  a l r e a d y  c o n s t r a i n e d ,  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  
process to fail to arrive at a cost-effective design in a timely way. That said, in our setting, all designs 
except Abraham were delivered on time and within budget, and Abraham’s design succeeded on the 
second round.  
However, there was a more subtle cost in terms of the innovativeness of the final designs. Half the 
schools in our sample only paid lip service to the national agenda to create transformative buildings for 
learning.  This  finding  coincides  with  other  studies  showing  that  incumbents  rarely  develop  radical 
innovations  (Morrison  1968,  Tushman  and  Anderson  1986,  Henderson  and  Clark  1990,  Christensen 
1997). To achieve a radical departure from the status quo, a different type of design organization, such as SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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a skunk works or an entrepreneurial startup, is usually needed. Our observed commons organization also 
preserved the existing distribution of wealth and resources. Whether this outcome is a bona fide tendency 
of commons organizations or a consequence of the fragilities of the focal commons, e.g., insufficient 
accountability of monitors to all the participants, merits further research. 
As its primary benefit, a commons organization creates an organization structure that induces a 
group of independent parties operating under a shared goal to invest time, effort, and knowledge in order 
to  reconcile  their  differences.  A  robust  commons  organization  recognizes,  paraphrasing  Ansari  et  al. 
(2013), that the claimants are part of the design problem and part of the solution. Our sample illustrates 
how, in the institutional context of a commons organization, all claimants were ready to cede a bit, 
working almost beyond the call of duty to succeed. Each school in our sample attested to spending 1,000 
or  more  hours  directly  on  design.  The  schools  supplied  time  and  knowledge  freely  and  pursued  the 
process to the end with great energy as did the Council staff and the contractors. Much of the teachers’ 
knowledge was tacit, or “sticky” (von Hippel 1994) and could only be elicited and assimilated by the staff 
and contractors by having the teachers react to specific proposals and explain face-to-face why they 
wanted what they wanted. We conjecture that if the teachers had just been consulted and not given design 
rights, the final designs would have been poorer as a result. 
A related benefit, documented in our research, was a high level of satisfaction among all the design 
participants  and  a  concomitant  perception  of  legitimacy  for  both  the  process  and  the  outcomes. 
Importantly,  the  Council  had  great  latitude  in  terms  of  how  it  enlisted  different  constituencies.  The 
schools’  faculties  were  the  only  user  groups  given  design  rights;  other  groups  such  as  parents  and 
community leaders were consulted but not given the power of veto. A robust design commons brings 
people who do not have ex officio design rights into the design organization, but it is still bounded and 
not open to every constituency. Low excludability is not the same as complete openness (Ostrom 1990). 
In summary, the design commons form of organizing solves a problem of provision (of specific 
knowledge, effort, and time) at the cost of an increased risk of collective action problems leading to SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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design failure. The solicitation and integration of knowledge and effort are fundamental problems that all 
organizations  face  (Lawrence  and  Lorsch,  1967;  Puranam  et  al.  2011).  On  the  one  hand,  a  design 
commons organization increases the participants’ incentives to contribute their knowledge and effort, but 
at the same time, it increases the difficulty and cost of integrating the various contributions. Indeed, our 
study suggests that, in a successful design commons organization, significant amounts of time must be 
spent in meetings to explain points of view, talk others into accepting ideas they were originally against, 
develop a shared language, and work out differences.  
Ostrom  argues  that  the  risk  of  failure  in  a  design  commons  organization  can  be  mitigated  by 
adhering  to  robust  organizational  principles.  The  Manchester  design  commons  organization  was  not 
consciously designed using Ostrom’s theory, but the commons literature shows that, using intuition and 
reasoning, people are capable of designing and adhering to effective rules. Relaxing or modifying the 
rules also turned out to be an important “adaptation mechanism” (O’Mahony and Bechky 2008) that acted 
as  a  safety  valve.  And  importantly,  in  our  sample,  design  flexibility  was  a  crucial  complement  to 
governance. The architects’ creativity in reconciling divergences allowed several steering groups to avoid 
impasse. Had flexibility not been used to attenuate subtractability, the commons organization might have 
collapsed. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have argued that a design commons can be an advantageous form of organizing 
design work when two conditions are simultaneously present: 1) high “subtractability” of design choices 
because different claimants have conflicting beliefs or preferences with respect to an integral design form, 
and 2) low “excludability” because different claimants will share the designed artifact in use. These two 
conditions define a so-called common pool resource (Ostrom, 2006). They are also characteristic of many 
multi-party  bargaining  situations,  including  projects  to  develop  long-lived  assets  such  as  hospitals, 
universities, factories, utility and transport networks, and other forms of physical infrastructure.  
In the case of infrastructure assets, a key task for those with design rights by virtue of position is to SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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set up the organization that will produce the actual design. Empirical accounts reveal again and again that 
those with design rights ex officio often opt not to share them with users and other potential claimants 
because they are well aware of the inherent collective action problems. Exclusion does not erase conflict, 
however. If the excluded parties are powerful and influential, they may try to sabotage the development 
process or lobby for changes that get increasingly costly and risky to implement as development unfolds 
(Morris 1987, Miller and Lessard 2001, Pitsis et al. 2003, Gil and Tether 2011). Hence an enduring goal 
in  various  literatures  has  been  to  search  for  organizational  forms  amenable  to  design  change  and 
concomitant trade-offs between flexibility and efficiency (cf. Pitsis et al. 2003).  
Our main contribution to these literatures is to show that a robust commons organization is a viable 
alternative way to organize the production of designs for infrastructure assets that have a high degree of 
design-choice  interdependency  and  also  affect  many  heterogeneous  groups. T h e  c o m m o n s  f o r m  o f  
organizing violates the precept of simple mirroring in that design rights for an integral structure are not 
contained within a centralized, hierarchical organization, but instead are distributed to parties that have 
conflicting beliefs and interests. Ex officio holders of design rights will share those rights selectively with 
knowledgeable parties, such as key user groups, in order to acquire valuable knowledge. The knowledge 
thus acquired serves to better align the final product with subsequent needs in use. Importantly, such 
knowledge is often tacit or “sticky”, thus consultation, observation and statistical analysis will not suffice 
to overcome intrinsic barriers to communication. However, if a design commons organization is robust, 
its  participants  can,  through  rule-making  and  repeated  interactions,  integrate  their  knowledge, 
compromise on their interests, seek creative solutions, and in this fashion, reconcile their differences. 
Filtered  through  this  process,  the  output  of  a  successful  design  commons  organization  is  a  timely, 
makeable design for long-lived asset that many people can both share and afford. 
Our second contribution is to extend commons theory to man-made artifacts, thereby enriching both 
commons theory and design theory. In the process, we have had to reconcile two disparate language 
systems. First, applying the terminology of commons theory, we showed that a design-in-process can be SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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both subtractable and non-excludable, and thus qualify as a common pool resource subject to commons 
governance. Modular vs. integral design structure, budgets, and longevity determine subtractability. Non-
excludability is determined by ex officio design rights as well as shared use of the final constructed 
artifact. Specifically, when the final good must be shared by many people, detailed knowledge of use 
patterns and requirements is essential to enhance the design. However, such knowledge is often tacit or 
sticky,  hence  difficult  to  transfer.  In  such  cases,  it  makes  sense  to  relax  de  jure  excludability  by 
determining which individuals possess essential knowledge and then giving them effective decision rights 
in the design process.  
In the process of applying commons theory to designs and design organizations, we also identified 
instances  where  commons  theory  is  ambiguous  in  application.  Most  importantly,  the  principle  of 
deference by outside authorities may pull in the opposite direction from access to low-cost conflict-
resolution mechanisms, especially when the authorities are claimants in their own right. We conjecture 
that, in some cases, it might be too easy – and not altogether advantageous – for commons participants to 
appeal  to  powerful  outside  referees.  Working  out  conflicts  at  the  operational  level  (e.g.,  within  the 
steering groups) might be costly in terms of immediate time and energy, but it affirms the collective and 
polycentric nature of the organization and thus can contribute to its success. 
Before concluding, we must emphasize that there are important limitations to the generalizability of 
this research. In the Manchester school design commons, the design requirements for each school were 
stable and each building was a separate site. Thus at the capital program level, the basic problem was 
large, but bounded and amenable to decomposition. The goal of the commons—to rebuild dilapidated 
schools—was  also  something  all  parties  believed  in,  hence  there  was  no  conflict  over  purpose.  The 
diversity in the backgrounds of the commons participants was limited: many had chosen careers of public 
service, and were residents or at least worked in the same city. Moreover, as a city, Manchester has a long 
history of civic pride, democratic socialism, and collective action. The schools’ faculties were judged (by 
Ofsted)  to  be  both  competent  and  dedicated  to  their  school’s  mission.  Lastly,  the  tight  rules  for SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS   J ANUARY 2014  
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membership of the steering groups kept the “working commons” organizations relatively small. Through 
repeated private interactions, the individuals in the steering groups could develop trust and the norms of 
civility and reciprocity. It is not clear whether these pre-conditions were all necessary for the commons’ 
success. Ostrom’s own work suggests that incompetence and corruption, failures to develop norms of 
civility and joint problem-solving, and increases in inequality will undermine a commons organization. 
(But this is true of other organizational forms as well.) 
In conclusion, our task in this paper has been to show that a design commons can be a useful way of 
organizing the design process for a long-lived non-modular asset that will be shared in use by many 
parties. Our research shows that this form of organizing, although it violates simple mirroring, does not 
inevitably  lead  to  failure  in  spite  of  high  interdependency  among  fundamental  design  choices. 
Furthermore,  consistent  with  Ostrom’s  principles, s e n s i b l e  a c t i o n s  i n  t e r m s  o f  d e f i n i n g  b o u n d a r i e s ,  
making benefits proportionate to costs, and having authorities defer to local rule-making can increase the 
robustness of the commons organization and thus its chances of success. In sum, the design commons 
form of organizing recognizes that users (and others) are both a repository of valuable knowledge and a 
source of conflict. To get access to their knowledge, the designers of the design organization must accept 
the inevitability of conflict and put their faith in the good sense of human beings to resolve it. 
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